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Capital Liberalisation and Economic Instability  
Kalim Siddiqui
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Abstract 
This study intends to examine the larger issues related to capital liberalisation and also to analyse the reasons for 
recent support of capital mobility and its repercussions for the future prospects of the economies of developing 
countries. The objective is to critically examine relevant empirical and theoretical studies in order to answer 
these questions and address the objectives of this study. The methodology adopted in this study relies on 
secondary information, reports and published studies to address the research questions. The study finds that 
following the adoption of capital liberalisation and neoliberalism, the economies of most developing countries 
have become more vulnerable. If China is excluded, we find that most developing economies have been unable 
to expand employment opportunities or reduce levels of poverty. In recent years capital liberalisation policy has 
encouraged capital flight from their economies..  
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1. Introduction 
This study aims to provide a deeper understanding of developing economies, by not simply 
re-emphasising the importance of capital control, but also highlighting the dynamics of 
transition that these economies are facing. The word ‘capital’ can be used to refer to “foreign 
direct investment”, that is capital invested into productive assets, which is not liquid, and 
“portfolio investment and bank loans”, which are highly liquid and could have wider impact 
on a country’s economy if left to flow unrestricted across borders. Financial liberalisation is a 
set of measures including central bank autonomy and freedom of movement of capital, and 
can also mean convertibility of currency, abandoning ‘priority sectors’, and adopting a policy  
of lending at differential interest rates to promote strategic sectors or industries in the 
domestic economy. (Chang and Grabel, 2014) 
Economists refer to capital control as a range of policies that are designed to manage global 
capital flows. Such policy initiatives can take many forms. For instance, restrictions can be 
placed on foreign investment in certain sectors, on capital outflows, or on access to the 
domestic or foreign currencies. Capital control received more support following the East 
Asian crisis in 1997-98 since previous policies of capital liberalisation as a result of IMF 
pressures resulted in a huge inflow of foreign capital into the East Asian economies, which 
was reflected in a lending boom and domestic banks took greater risks. The government 
failed to prevent funds from being used to finance speculative activities. (Dymski, 2010)  
Policy can place restrictions on foreign capital investment in domestic assets (government 
securities and bank deposits) or on domestic capital moving abroad. As extreme measures to 
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control market forces, the government may impose control over international transactions. If 
the government wants to have virtual control over foreign exchange, it can decide who they 
would like to distribute those foreign currencies, the advantage being that with such measures 
it can influence the markets. Capital control can provide greater options for economic matters 
and policies, especially fiscal and monetary policies. (Dymski, 2010) The balance of 
payments can also be influenced by capital control measures. 
Those in favour of capital liberalisation argue that capital will flow from the developed 
countries, where it provides low marginal returns, to developing countries where it is 
assumed that it is scarce, meaning that free capital movement would imply high marginal 
returns. (Crotty and Epstein, 1999; Siddiqui, 2016) They subscribe to the policy of removing 
foreign exchange controls in developing countries so that they can run large current account 
deficits. This means that capital account liberalisation was expected to delink investment 
from domestic savings. Following such policies was expected to increase investment in 
developing countries meaning that would have more capital, which would be greater than 
their domestic savings, and would invest more, and ultimately, they would have higher 
growth rates. As Maurice Obstfeld (1998) has noted,  
“economic theory leaves no doubt about the potential advantages” of capital account 
liberalization, which is also sometimes called financial openness. This permits the 
international capital market to channel world savings to their most profitable regions 
in the world. Those developing countries with has little domestic savings can borrow 
to finance investment, thereby could experience growth rates without requiring sharp 
increases in their own saving. However, Obstfeld also warns the possible risks of 
openness to foreign financial flows and concluded that “this duality of benefits and 
risks is inescapable in the real world.” (Obstfeld, 1998:28) 
The relationship between financial openness and economic growth is far from straight 
forward. Most surprisingly, the recent the IMF study (2016) has openly expressed scepticism 
about its earlier position on neoliberalism. The IMF study argues:  
“Some capital inflows, such as foreign direct investment—which may include a 
transfer of technology or human capital—do seem to boost long-term growth. But the 
impact of other flows—such as portfolio investment and banking and especially hot, 
or speculative, debt inflows—seem neither to boost growth nor allow the country to 
better share risks with its trading partners … This suggests that the growth and risk-
sharing benefits of capital flows depend on which type of flow is being considered; it 
may also depend on the nature of supporting institutions and policies…Although 
growth benefits are uncertain, costs in terms of increased economic volatility and 
crisis frequency seem more evident. Since 1980, there have been about 150 episodes 
of surges in capital inflows in more than 50 emerging market economies”. (Ostry, et 
al, 2016) 
In fact, since the adoption of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, the inflow of foreign capital 
into the economies of developing countries has risen sharply; however, not all of them 
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experienced rapid growth. (Siddiqui, 2014a) The adoption of a capital liberalisation policy 
did lead to a rise in growth rates in some developing countries, but exposed them to economic 
vulnerability and financial crisis. Those in favour of capital liberalisation suggest that this 
largely happened due to short-term inflows, which increase the risk of sudden capital flow 
reversals (Bonizzi, 2014). On the other hand, critics of this policy such as Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) highlighted the difficulties of capital liberalisation, concluding that there is a 
high correlation between domestic saving and investment ratios. Other studies also found that 
most of the East Asian countries that have had high growth rates also had very high domestic 
savings and were net creditors, not net borrowers, and also had a current account surplus. 
Capital liberalization is one of the most controversial aspects of modern political economy. 
The problem seems to be due not only to liberalisation rules governing inflows of capital but 
to those affecting portfolio capital investments, which is short-term and speculative. Here, we 
intend to examine why capital liberalisation has become so important to the economy of a 
country and why neglecting this or leaving it to market forces, has frequently led to economic 
instability in developing countries in recent years (Siddiqui, 1998) The experience of the 
Latin America and East Asian countries in the 1990s shows that those countries that made the 
effort to become financially more open and integrated, paradoxically witnessed higher levels 
of economic and financial instability. (Ocampo and Stiglitz, 2008) 
During the East Asian crisis of 1997, capital flows were seen as an important element in the 
currency and exchange rate crisis. Therefore, control of capital movements has been 
suggested as a means of supporting fixed exchange rates and avoiding speculative attacks on 
currencies. A ‘developmental model’ followed earlier in the East Asian countries meant 
governments undertook a number of independent policy measures to reduce vulnerability to 
global financial shocks. (Wade, 1990; Siddiqui, 2016a) 
The strategy of East Asian export-oriented economies has been to achieve higher domestic 
savings relative to investment. Policy intervention helps to maintain desirable exchange rates 
and competitiveness. At the same time the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves allows 
them to maintain the undervaluation of foreign exchange rate to stimulate exports. (Siddiqui, 
2016b) 
There has been wide discussion concerning whether the East Asian crisis was due to “over-
lending” and “over-borrowing”, which might have been re-enforced by distortions in 
incentives or regulations. Commenting on the reasons for this crisis Arestis and Glickman 
(2002) note, 
“The most striking of these relates to the question of whether the source of the Asian 
crisis was endogenous or exogenous and the related issue of the coincidence or 
otherwise of financial liberalisation and financial crisis. A further crucial difference is 
that whilst [the conventional view] holds one group of actors or another to blame our 
Minskyan thesis incorporates all of them into an endogenous interpretation of the 
crisis”. (Arestis and Glickman, 2002:255) 
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They argue that many developing countries lack the domestic savings and foreign capital that 
could help to finance their business activities. However, the proponents of foreign capital 
ignore the fact that certain types of foreign capital can provide long-term investment and 
business commitment, while other capital inflows might be short-term and less stable. When 
economic crisis hit these developing countries, capital rapidly left them for the safety of 
developed economies. (Minsky, 1986) 
The methodology followed here is derived from the aims of the study and comparisons of 
international statistics are used as the main means of addressing the research questions and 
the objectives of this paper. Analysing relevant literature, empirical studies, and existing 
secondary data is the only possible way to obtain macroeconomic data. These include data 
from official sources and from international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD 
and UNCTAD. 
The study also intends to critically examine the wider issues related to the capital movements 
in the developing countries including their economic stability and sovereignty. Financial 
globalisation represents a very important development in recent global economy. In this 
current phase of globalization, capital is far more mobile than it ever was in the past. In fact, 
the colonial period was characterised by segregation in the world economy, despite free trade, 
and no legal means was in place to control the flow of capital from the metropolis to the 
colonies. (Siddiqui, 2015a) However, despite the availability of low wages, capital did not 
move freely in the colonies, except in certain limited spheres such as mining, railways and 
plantations. (Chang and Grabel, 2014; Siddiqui, 1989) The neo-classical model of perfect 
competition, with perfect information and perfect capital markets does not hold in the real 
world. 
During the 1930s Latin America delinked themselves from the world’s capitalist economies 
and began a policy of import substitution industrialisation and, as a result, experienced higher 
growth rates, allowing them to establish a manufacturing sector.   
Another question arises concerning the evidence supporting the proposition? that capital 
liberalization would be good for developing countries, a policy which was imposed through 
‘structural adjustment programme’ and ‘globalisation’ by the World Bank and IMF. The 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) also supports capital liberalisation and suggests that it is 
good for growth, as it provided more capital for investments. However, it does not provide 
any clear evidence that this is promoting economic stability in the developing countries. 
(Crotty and Epstein, 1999) 
In December 2015, WTO’s ministerial conference in Nairobi explicitly discussed GATS 
(General Agreement on Trade in Services). During this meeting, as had previously been the 
case, it was obvious that the developed countries were keen to support capital liberalisation. 
In fact, in the developed countries services account for rising share of output and 
employment. In addition the manufacturing sector in these countries has generally become 
less competitive whilst the financial sector has become more significant and is dominated by 
the financial centres of New York, London and Frankfurt. Liberalisation in financial services 
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was the most important element of globalisation, increasing the developed countries financial 
companies’ access into the markets of developing countries. This was possible due to the 
removal of domestic capital control measures and the reduction in domestic financial 
regulation in recent years. 
2. Capital Mobility, Current Account Surplus and Growth Rates 
Those countries that have witnessed rapid growth rates also have a considerable positive 
current account. With the non-availability of foreign capital inflows, countries with current 
account deficits are forced to devalue, and as a result imports are more expensive and exports 
cheaper. Such policy measures are expected to lead to improvements in the balance of 
payments situation. The liberalisation of capital measures increases capital inflows, but may 
also lead to appreciation in exchange rates, as witnessed in many developing countries in 
recent years, which drove down their export demands and increased imports, leading to 
negative current accounts and currency crises. For example, in China in the early 2000s, the 
central bank intervened in the foreign exchange markets to keep Renminbi appreciation under 
control. (Bond and Garcia, 2015) As Figure 1 shows, the relationship between current 
account surplus and growth rates has been positive. 
In Figure 2, the upper left-hand quadrant shows current account deficits matched to capital 
account surplus as is often seen in text books. However, in the lower right-hand quadrant 
countries such as Russia and Nigeria show the problems associated with the ‘resource-curse’. 
Such countries appear to have capital account deficits, which are financed by current account 
surplus. Periodic overvaluation may be caused by large inflows of foreign capital associated 
with their resource sector, a case of the so-called “Dutch disease”, meaning a loss of 
competitiveness in their export sector. However, when the current account surplus is not 
available to finance capital outflows; this would mean mounting pressures for devaluation 
and currency crises.  
Figure1: Average annual growth rates of GDP per capita and average current account 
balance, 1970-2013 
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Source: Calculations based on the World Bank, Development Indicators and IMF, Balance of 
Payments, various years. 
Figure 2: Average current account balance and capital flows to large developing countries (% 
GDP 2000-2014) 
 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments; various years, IMF. 
The UNDP (2013) report recommends a number of neoliberal policies such as further 
integration with the global markets, to adhere rules of global governance, and financial 
liberalisation. However, the report ignores the fact that increased dependence on foreign 
markets would mean increased vulnerability to the volatile nature of global finance, which 
has been in the recent past marked by speculation, capital flights, and economic crises. Such 
policies would run counter to the developing countries aim of economic sovereignty, and also 
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pro-poor, and poverty alleviation goals of the economic inclusion agenda. As Soederberg 
(2015) argues:  
“[Financial liberalisation] has done little to deliver on the neoliberal promise of 
growth and progress through investments in production and thus the creation of stable 
and sustainable wages and, by extension, poverty reduction. Indeed, the increased 
frequency and intensity of financial debacles has made the South, and especially the 
poor therein, more susceptible to the aftershocks of speculative-led accumulation”. 
Soederberg (2015:253) 
There has been a rapid increase in capital flows in recent years due to gross inflows of private 
capital from nearly 6% of GDP in 1991 to more than double that amount in developing 
countries in 2013. This was an unprecedented development but at the same time it has made 
these economies more vulnerable to the perils of financial globalisation. 
In the post-war period state control over cross-border capital flows was seen to be a very 
important policy measure within the macroeconomic framework. It was intended to ensure 
that the State could act without fear of triggering capital outflows, i.e. not having to be 
concerned about what disgruntled financiers, who might otherwise have taken their funds out, 
thought of its actions. The Bretton Woods system was introduced soon after the Second 
World War, allowing countries to have capital controls, and all of them had such controls in 
place. In the post-war period, capital control, both in the developing and the developed 
countries, was considered to be a normal part of policy measures, seen as essential 
government tools of economic management. Governments deployed capital control measures 
to enhance macroeconomic policies aimed at controlling and promoting financial and 
currency stability. In fact, this form of control was seen as a useful tool for promoting 
industrialization and competitiveness. (Grabel, 2006) 
During the period 2000-2007 in particular, developing countries received large capital 
inflows, fuelled by the availability of cheap credit in the developed countries and booming 
commodity prices. (Bonizzi, 2014) The experiences of nearly two decades of crises including 
that of Mexico in 1997, East Asia in 1997-98, and Argentina in 2001, sparked discussions 
about the need for prudent measures to manage capital flows in developing countries. The 
cycle of boom and bust experienced by several developing countries necessitated a clear 
policy regarding how to deal with the capital inflows during the boom and how to respond to 
a situation of sudden and rapid outflows of capital during economic crisis.  
The capital liberalisation of the last two decades has increased consumption and output 
variability. However, if capital inflows are dominated by the portfolio this could have adverse 
consequences for the developing countries. As Stiglitz (2004) argues,  
“Capital market liberalization [in East Asia and Latin America] has played a role in 
contributing to economic instability. Money rushed into the country, often financing a 
consumption binge, and then rushed out; as it left, financial institutions were 
weakened, often bankrupted, and exchange rates plummeted, leaving those with 
dollar-denominated debts hard pressed to meet their obligations. During the inflows, 
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the exchange rate appreciates, posing problems for the import competing and export 
sectors. Some governments (Thailand in the mid-1990s) attempt to prevent this and at 
the same time, avoid the economy overheating; this necessitates cutting back on high-
return public investment and raising interest rates […] During the outflows, financial 
institutions are devastated, and the lack of credit contributes to the economic 
downturn”. (Stiglitz, 2004:63) 
It would be useful here to re-consider the merits of two widely used economic formulations, 
namely the Mundell-Fleming “impossible trinity” and the Taylor Rule of monetary policy. 
According to Mundell-Fleming, a country can only have two of the following three: monetary 
sovereignty, a fixed exchange rate, and free capital flows. The Taylor Rule is bound by which 
a central bank adjusts its short-term interest rates based on the differential between a 
country’s potential and actual GDP, and between the inflation target and actual inflation. 
Developing countries may be constrained to respond to the external financial cycle, which 
could distort the Taylor Rule. In fact, if domestic growth concerns warrant low interest rates, 
a sudden fall in capital inflows may induce them to raise interest rates to attract foreign 
capital thereby exacerbating the downturn in the business cycle.   
3. IMF Response to Capital Mobility Issue 
The governments of developing countries are consistently told that capital control is 
impossible to enforce or too disruptive of normal global business relationships and may also 
encourage corruption. There is no doubt that IMF prescriptions in recent years have shown 
more flexibility than in the past when managing countries in crisis. However, the IMF still 
lends support to neo-liberal strategies and justifies this on the grounds that in the long term 
such policies will help developing countries. Overall its prescriptions on this issue have been 
incoherent.  
In the wake of the East Asian crisis of 1997, many developing countries greatly increased 
their foreign exchange reserve so that they would a bigger cushion in the event of future crisis 
but this additional reserve is not being used to promote faster growth They also have to 
maintain higher rates of interests because under open capital market conditions; capital can 
leave the country en masse. Higher interest rates increase the cost of borrowing, which could 
discourage local businesses from borrowing and investing.  
A few developing countries have imposed capital controls as a means of protecting domestic 
economies from the effects of global liberalised financial markets and in recent years the IMF 
has been less critical about such policies. However, this can be contrasted with its response 
when Malaysia imposed capital control during the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. Then 
the IMF referred to this control of capital outflows as a backwards step and one IMF 
representative stated that ‘foreign investors in Malaysia have been expropriated, and the 
Malaysians will bear the cost of their distrust for years’. (cited in Kaplan and Rodrik, 
2001:11) In December 2006, capital controls in Thailand were reversed after only a few days 
by its Central Bank when a military coup replaced the previous elected government and such 
measures immediately triggered massive capital flights from the country. 
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The Chilean government also undertook measures aimed at controlling capital inflows, 
requiring foreign investors to keep their investment in the country for at least one year, and a 
percentage of the investment to be placed in an interest-free deposit with the central bank. 
Such policies certainly can impact on short-term debt. (Crotty and Epstein, 1999) When 
South Korea removed capital control on short-term foreign bank borrowing, but imposed 
restrictions on long-term capital inflows such as foreign purchases of stocks and foreign 
direct investments, large scale borrowing by their banks resulted in the 1997 East Asian 
financial crisis. (Chang and Grabel, 2014) 
Excessive short-term foreign currency inflows could take place because local banks may 
borrow a lot of overseas capital. In such circumstances, imposing capital control may help to 
establish the supervision and regulation of the country’s financial system. Some argue that 
such provisions may be less effective in the long term, as investors and borrowers may find 
ways to undermine such regulations. (Magud and Reinhart, 2006) 
It is interesting to analyse Iceland’s experience of financial policy, since the country was 
advised to adopt capital control as a short-term strategy. It was the first country to sign the 
Small Business Act (SBA) for Europe which is the EU’s flagship policy initiative to support 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It comprises a set of policy measures ranging 
from ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘responsive administration’ to ‘internationalisation’. To improve 
governance and entrepreneurship during the financial crisis in 2008, the SBA was the first 
financial rescue measure in the Western Europe since that of the UK in 1976. Iceland initially 
approached its Scandinavian neighbours for help and then Russia in 2008. When all these 
efforts failed, some Western European countries suggested that it should negotiate an 
arrangement with the IMF, which the country did in the late autumn of 2008. The SBA 
negotiation provisions recommended that Iceland should adopt stringent capital control 
measures, the deputy managing director of the IMF emphasising that it should make capital 
control an essential feature of the monetary policy framework, given the scale of potential 
capital outflows. Iceland initially imposed capital control prior to signing of SBA in October 
2008 and the IMF recommended that it was a necessity to maintain financial stability. 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) 
In 1991, the Icelandic government began to adopt neo-liberal economic policies including 
privatisation of public assets. Stock markets and the housing sector experienced massive 
growth, and all these combined effects made Iceland’s per capita GDP one of the world’s 
highest by the 2006. However, in 2008 its economy collapsed, when the country’s three 
largest banks were forced to declare bankruptcy, and its GDP shrank sharply. 
Until the late 1980s, Iceland’s largest banks were state-owned and as a result capital was 
rationed amongst different sectors and industries. The government fixed nominal interest 
rates, and the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) was seen to be implementing government 
policies. However, banks were largely managed with the aim of benefitting political parties 
and market forces were introduced to break the stranglehold of the domestic economy. These 
steps were taken because state ownership of banks and other big businesses placed limits on 
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the profit opportunities of the capitalist class in general and therefore, privatisation in the 
1990s was seen as a good avenue for investors. 
In the late 1980s, real interest rates were low and even negative for a long period in Iceland’s 
government-owned banks. As a result, credit demands soared with banks allocating credit to 
favoured businesses. This resulted in inefficiencies in resource allocation and debts rose 
relative to equity. 
4. Capital Flows and Monetary Policies 
Monetary theory predicts that when the exchange rate is fixed, capital flows will equalise 
domestic and international interest rates, in a situation when monetary policy is losing its 
ability to influence domestic activity. Similarly Obstfeld and Taylor have supported the view 
that it is impossible to maintain free capital flows, a fixed exchange rate and an independent 
monetary policy at the same time. (Williamson, 2007) 
At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, where the new post-war economic policies were 
agreed, J. M. Keynes said the single most important achievement agreed was that all 
countries should have the right to restrict capital movements, provided that the restrictions 
were not aimed at restricting trade. Keynes strongly believed that the earlier crises, such as 
the Great Depression and the Second World War, owed a great deal to the volatility induced 
by free capital movements. Therefore, according to him, the benefits of trade would be at risk 
if countries were to remove capital control. 
The US dollar is the dominant international currency. At present about three-quarters of the 
total global currency reserves are held in US dollars. The US has the biggest and most liquid 
capital market in the world but this is continuously maintained and supplied by US deficit 
financing. The US has also put all its efforts into encouraging the rest of the world to open 
their capital accounts and remove all impediments to the inflows and outflows of capital. In 
the name of neo-liberal reforms, all forms of social control of the markets are reduced. 
(Siddiqui, 2009a, Zhang, 2009) 
Another major discrepancy is that the macroeconomic policies applicable in the case of 
developed countries were too often recommended to developing countries, despite the fact 
that the economic structures, institutions and capital markets of the latter group are very 
different from those of the former. Mishkin (2004) identifies the difficulties faced by 
developing countries as being weak fiscal institutions, weak financial institutions including 
government regulation and vulnerability to sudden variations in capital flows. 
It is argued that financial integration allows domestic businesses in developing countries to 
borrow in anticipation of future incomes. Following such arguments led to the opening up of 
their capital accounts to international finance. However, it was soon realised that asset 
markets are different from goods markets, and in addition financial markets in developing 
countries are different from those in their developed counterparts.  
On the issue of outward-looking industrialization policy, Sen (2007:293-94) argues that, 
“Japan and Korea had almost no foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, while others such as 
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Singapore, and later China, had these in ample quantities…and the absence of any portfolio 
flows in the early stages of development. But the sharp contradictions in the fast growing 
economies of Asia, India liberalised both the current−and capital−account components of its 
balance of payments …this in spite of evidence showing that those who opened their capital 
accounts to anything more than FDI quickly landed themselves in trouble as in the Latin 
America”. Malaysia undertook capital control measures in 1998 to prevent capital flight and 
increase its control over the domestic capital market and exchange rate value of its currency. 
The government adopted a number of measures in monetary and fiscal policies to address the 
domestic imbalances and to deal with the recession. (Siddiqui, 2009b) Malaysia’s control 
policies have produced a faster economic recovery, a lower reduction in employment, and a 
quicker turnaround in the stock market. Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) analysed how Malaysia 
was able to achieve this better performance and control capital flight in comparison to South 
Korea and Thailand. They found that unlike Thailand and South Korea where interest rates 
fell sharply, in Malaysia interest rates remained stable due to a ceiling of 2.5% points over the 
base lending rate. The Malaysian government was careful to target short-term speculative 
capital inflows, while insulating capital inflows. Malaysia recovered from the East Asian 
crisis more quickly and its exchange rates were stabilised, while those countries, which 
adopted the orthodox policies experienced a longer and deeper crisis. Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamed was criticised for going against the region’s widely accepted 
liberalisation policies. (Siddiqui, 2012) 
With capital control the government in Malaysia can pursue its domestic economic policies 
without the worries of a balance of payments crisis. Speculative attacks in East Asia and 
Mexico were fuelled by large movements in inflows and outflows of capital. The Malaysian 
government set a limit on capital outflows in 1998 to help the economy and to regain 
financial stability. 
Gallagher’s (2014) cross-country study found that among the East Asian countries, those that 
had applied capital control were able to perform better. Similar results were found by the 
other empirical studies. (Magud and Reinhart, 2006) The Malaysian response to the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 offers an interesting lesson since soon after the crisis the 
country witnessed a rise in state ownership, as large numbers of family-owned enterprises 
were merged into state-owned firms. The differences between President Mahathir and his 
deputy Anwar Ibrahim become open, resulting in the removal of Ibrahim in 1998. As a result, 
Mahathir consolidated his power and all those businesses seen to be close to Ibrahim lost 
government favour. The government increased its grip over the corporate sector and banks, 
and ultimately influenced lending and credit policies with further shifts towards government-
owned companies. Capital controls were aimed at minimising the risks of exit by large-scale 
investors, currency conversion by domestic and foreign asset holders and the risks associated 
with cross-border derivate. (Gallagher, 2014; Stiglitz, 2004) These measures were intended to 
enhance the autonomy of domestic policy and to insulate the domestic economy from crises 
in other countries.  
However, the problem is the experiences of developing countries in the late 1970s, when the 
huge accumulation of liquidity in the banks based in developed countries led them to increase 
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their lending and investment in the developing countries. Soon after the debt crisis in the 
1980s, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 and more recently the global financial crisis of 
2008, all made it clear that capital deregulation could lead to the loss of domestic sovereignty 
in macroeconomic policy, leading to a balance of payment crisis, currency instability, and 
capital flight.  
Financial deregulation has two elements: liberalization of international capital flows and 
deregulation of domestic financial systems. This has led to dramatic change in the financial 
sector. These changes have given rise to sharp rise in the financial speculation activities and 
also such development has strengthened the influence of financial in the economy. In fact, the 
deregulation and removal of control on international capital flows has created a situation 
where countries could run large current account deficits (or surplus). This also has opened the 
possibility of a debt-led growth model and as a result a consumption boom. A country’s 
exchange rates are often seen to be determined by capital flows rather than trade balances. 
Capital flows have often financial motives and are pro-cycle. As Stockhammer (2015) 
emphasises that:  
“The deregulation of international capital flows has loosened external trade 
constraints. It has allowed countries to run larger current account deficits for longer 
periods...episodes of strong capital inflows (capital flow bonanzas) usually come with 
speculative bubbles on financial and property markets and typically end in recessions. 
Financial globalization has thus ironically increased the room for different 
developments across countries. Current account imbalances can be maintained for 
longer – essentially as long as markets trust the situation”. (Stockhammer, 2015:943) 
Financial liberalisation expands access to capital via greater inflow of capital such as foreign 
direct investment, portfolio flows and other types of capital movements. The developed 
countries also demand international standards on governing capital accounts, financial 
markets, exchange rates, accounting systems and banking operations. (Siddiqui, 2015a) 
Another major difficulty with capital liberalisation is that it brings increased dependence on 
monetary policy of international financial institutions such as the Federal Reserve and the 
European Central Bank. Low interest rates can flood developing countries with liquidity, 
heightening the risks for their economies when a tightening policy is imposed. A sudden 
slowdown in growth rates in international economies may lead to political unrest and chaos, 
which is not of their making. (Siddiqui, 2015b) 
Hence in the age of global finance the issue of creditworthiness has become a matter of 
importance for governments and it may be seen as prudent to pursue only those policies that 
are approved or in line with global finance. Governments do not want to see sudden outflows 
and panic in the financial markets which may prove disastrous for the national economy. 
(Epstein, 2005a) In fact, the liberalisation of capital’s social obligations, such as priority 
sector lending targets and changes in differential interest rates, could have adverse 
consequences particularly for SMEs leading to a rise in unemployment. (Siddiqui, 2014c) 
The government is obliged to defend large and global businesses and financial interests.  
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5. Experiences of Capital Liberalisation 
After the global financial crisis in 2008 many developing countries imposed capital control 
with the aim to regulate capital flows, especially to reduce foreign capital going into 
speculation. This step was supposed to help to keep inflationary pressures and pressures on 
currency appreciation under control.  
In December 2007, Taiwan imposed restrictions on capital inflows with the aim of 
minimising speculative pressures from overseas investors. (Zhang, 2009) Similarly, in June 
2015, Argentina imposed capital control and government charges of 6% were imposed on 
overseas investors. The experiences of Latin American countries in the 1990s tell us that the 
lack of macroeconomic balance-budget turned into current-account deficits. This suggests 
that inadequate regulation and supervision of the financial sector can have disastrous 
consequences. 
It seems that the mercantilist strategy of the East Asian countries rather than the open capital 
account policy of Latin America is preferable for developing economies. India’s capital 
account was opened to capital inflows on the grounds this would accelerate growth and 
investment, but its continuing trade deficit owing to the absence of real depreciation is a drag 
on the growth in income. (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar, 2009) Moreover, foreign capital 
inflows have not led to an investment boom in India. Klein (2012:4) argues that “There may 
be political reasons that make it difficult to impose capital controls during booms”.  As the 
financial system is becoming increasingly integrated, it appears that the time horizons of FDI 
and portfolio capital investment are quite different. FDI is generally seen as long term while 
portfolio investment implies a narrower timespan. 
When Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) analysed the macroeconomic causes of changes in 
capital control on capital outflows in 22 emerging economies, they found that these were: 
fiscal concerns, overheating concerns, foreign exchange valuation concerns, macroeconomic 
stability and financial stability concerns. They concluded that the decision to liberalise capital 
concerns was related to net capital inflows such as higher appreciation pressure in the 
exchange market, and the accumulation of reserves. The currency appreciation generated by 
an upsurge in capital inflows can decrease export competitiveness and have an adverse 
impact on the manufacturing sector and employment situation within a country. The national 
government can fight exchange rate appreciation by accumulating international reserves.  
Epstein (2005b) defines financialization as, “The increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and 
international economics”. (Epstein, 2005b:4) He further says that the predominant form of 
capital is financial capital, since the financial sector has displaced the real or productive 
sector, relegating it to a subordinate position. Financialization works differently in countries 
where the financial system is based on capital markets and banking structures, and in 
developing countries these systems are unlikely to converge with Anglo-American market 
economies. The export sectors of developing countries are not able to attain current account 
surplus and they may find it increasingly difficult to attract capital inflows to balance their 
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external sector. Therefore, in such circumstances these countries have to offer increased 
financial returns to foreign capital investors and lower wages in order for foreign markets to 
compete in the world market. (Epstein, 2005a) 
Prior to the 1981 economic crisis, Mexico followed import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), 
which produced a deep crisis and led to the dismantling of the government’s interventionist 
policies. Among the economic reforms adopted, the government began with a de-regulation 
programme aimed at introducing ‘efficiency’ into the banking sector and reducing 
government intervention in the financial sector. Later, in 1990, the globalisation of Mexico’s 
financial system took place and its capital market was opened to foreign portfolio 
investments. Finally, in 2000, with the further implementation of NAFTA, which was signed 
in 1994, Mexico adopted financial innovation, creating the conditions for securitization 
activities and greater involvement of both foreign international banks and corporations. As a 
result, these foreign companies increased their control over the banking and non-banking 
sectors such as investment banks, insurance companies and pension funds. (Levy-Orlik, 
2014) 
The major activity of the foreign companies operating in the Mexico’s financial sector was to 
advance credits; however the availability of more capital did not benefit its economy. As 
Levy-Orlik (2014:113-114) notes:  
“The Mexican economy has not benefitted from greater access to credit. On the 
contrary, Mexico has the lowest ratio of credit to GDP (an average 14%) among Latin 
American countries. Small and medium-size businesses constitute an important sector 
that has reduced credit availability, partly because these businesses have little to no 
credit history or collateral and are therefore unable to guarantee payment in case of 
default. While the dynamic part of credit (channelled to households) has expanded, its 
share continues to be relatively small”.  Levy-Orlik (2014:113-114) 
The manufacturing sector, which had an important role under previous ISI strategies due to 
the adoption of NAFTA and market policies, did not experience drastic changes. Despite the 
increase in exports in the post-NAFTA period, the export sector was unable to achieve a 
surplus. Analysis of the country’s foreign trade deficit shows that the manufacturing sector 
deficit is higher than its total trade deficit. Despite the fall in overall investment spending, 
those manufacturing industries specialising in exports of high technology have done well, 
while the traditional manufacturing industries have experienced a sharp decline in exports. 
The high tech industries are based on the maquiladora structure, which specialises in 
assembling goods that have strong import content and thus, to increase exports, imports must 
go up. (Levy-Orlik, 2014) In Mexico, the banking sector has experienced profound 
institutional changes as bank ownership was transferred to foreign corporations, who took 
advantage of oligopolistic banking structures to gain further control over this sector. During 
this period of financialization and capital liberalisation the inflows of foreign capital and 
portfolio have increased, but to attract this international capital Mexico had to offer higher 
financial returns than those available on the global financial markets.  
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Brazil increased its interest rates, as it felt it was necessary to stop capital outflows, which 
could have an adverse impact on output and employment. Despite removing tax on capital 
inflows in 2008, the Brazilian government re-imposed 2% tax on portfolio inflows in late 
2009. (BCB, 2014) These were modest efforts, aimed at slowing down the appreciation of the 
currency in the face of capital inflows into the country. (Ostry, et al. 2010; Sen, 2007) 
In the 1990s Brazil began to accelerate the linkage of its financial systems with global 
finance. When Lula took over as president, he simply followed the measures taken previously 
by Cardoso’s government to prepare the Brazilian economy to participate fully in global 
finances. Since the 2000s, efforts were made to ensure the country’s close cooperation with 
global finances in order to offer high profits and it was realised that not trade but finance 
helped Brazil to integrate with the world economy. The Lula government took measures to 
consolidate the country’s position as a provider of cheap assets in the name of attracting 
finances. This becomes much clearer, if we consider the interest on foreign payments. This 
amount increased from US$ 12 billion in 1990 to US$ 21 billion in 2002, then US$ 29 billion 
in 2005, finally reaching more than US$ 35 billion in 2007. Growth in portfolio investment 
has been impressive increasing rapidly from US$ 400 million in 1990 to US$ 8 billion 2002 
and US$ 13 billion in 2007. (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2015) and the stocks of productive 
and financial assets owned by the non-residential have grown rapidly. (BCB, 2014) Brazil’s 
exports remained technologically backward and insufficiently dynamic in terms of world 
trade, becoming increasingly dominated by the agrarian sector, minerals and steel. In these 
sectors Brazil has the competitive edge because of low wages and its abundant natural 
resources, especially land and water. 
Thailand imposed capital control in May 1997 and the aim was to stabilise foreign exchange 
and dampen speculative activities, as it was viewed that using interest rates as a means to 
defend the bhat. However, soon it was found that government measures were not 
comprehensive enough to eliminate the speculative pressure on the baht. As Edison and 
Reinhart (2000) study on capital control of Thailand (1997) and Malaysia (1998-99) find 
different results for both countries. Their studies focused on economic performance, foreign 
exchange reserves and capital flows, which concludes that:  
“[It] emerges from our empirical work is that the controls used in Thailand did not 
appear to deliver much of what they were intended. By contrast, in the case of 
Malaysia, the controls did align more closely with the priors of what controls were 
intended to achieve – namely greater interest rate and exchange rate stability and 
more policy autonomy – although initially, at least, these measures did not prevent 
mutual funds from exiting the country… The results do suggest that the timing of 
capital controls and the types of controls that are plied might have something to do 
with the success of controls”. (Edison and Reinhart, 2000:20) 
During periods of financial crisis developing countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand have all used various capital control measures to control 
capital flows, especially short-term and speculative ones entering the country that could have 
had adverse effects on their economies in terms of asset markets and exchange rates. South 
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Korea’s currency, the Won, appreciated rapidly in 2008 and the government set a limit on 
speculative capital and levied an outflow tax on capital gains of foreign purchases of 
government bonds. In return for financial assistance from the IMF, Thailand and South Korea 
adopted neoliberal reforms meaning that fiscal spending was reduced and interest rates were 
adjusted in the line with market-determined rates. 
An IMF study on capital control measures has provided some guidelines for member 
countries designed to minimise currency appreciation and asset bubbles during the 2008 
international financial crisis. (IMF, 2012) However, such recommendations were given under 
special circumstances. Ostry et al.’s (2010) study supported the policy of capital control to 
shorten the recession period. They also find that “such controls, moreover, can retain their 
potency even if investors devise strategies to bypass them […] the cost of circumvention 
strategies act like sand in the wheels”. (Ostry, et al 2010:5) 
After independence from Britain in 1947, India embarked on a policy of ‘import-
substitution’, in which industrialisation with the state playing a leading role was the 
‘commanding height’ of the economy. (Siddiqui, 2014a) In 1969, India’s then Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi, took a populist measure by nationalising fourteen commercial banks 
and a decade later, there was rising inefficiency in public sector organisations, which were 
allowed to borrow at high interest rates from these government-owned banks. All these 
strategies did not bring any long term solutions. However, in the 1980s, the Indian economy 
began to open up to foreign capital and envisaged a greater role for foreign trade. These 
market-oriented policies became more obvious in 1991, when India approached the IMF for a 
bail-out and in return accepted further implementation of neoliberal economic reforms that 
included opening up its economy for goods and capital, privatization of public industries and 
a roll-back in state involvement in the economy. (Siddiqui, 2014b) However, with increasing 
economic crisis in the 1980s, India moved towards assigning a greater role to foreign capital 
and overseas businesses, and significantly eased its capital control policy. Growing criticism 
of government financial repression to improve the performance of the financial sector led to 
formation of the government appointed Narsimham Committee in 1991 which recommended 
relaxing the interest rate ceilings amongst other things. To increase competition, foreign and 
domestic banks were allowed to operate. Foreign capital inflows were encouraged and the 
companies were allowed to remit their principal, dividends and profits and sales proceeds. 
(Siddiqui, 2009a) 
Since early 1990s, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has moved towards market-oriented 
economic policies. Under such policies, issues related to the monetary transmission 
mechanism have gained increased importance. (Siddiqui, 2009b) The central banks in 
developing countries take into account the foreign variables when setting their monetary 
policies. Often they have taken debts in foreign currencies, such as US dollars, and hence any 
default can make the situation worse than that of the central banks in these countries, so often 
the policy was to let the exchange rate fluctuate freely. Monetary policy in developing 
countries is constrained by the international banks such as Federal Reserve, the European 
Central Bank and Bank of Japan. Foreign trade is also primarily invoiced in US dollars; 
therefore, any drastic variations in exchange rates could have adverse effects on foreign trade. 
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For these reasons, central banks in developing countries try to stabilise exchange rates 
without explicitly stating this. Since 2005, in India bank credit to the commercial sector has 
accounted for more than 70% of total domestic credit. The currency to deposit ratio has 
declined since 1999. It is also known that in India the bank plays a role in financial 
intermediation and that the non-financial sector lacks alternative sources of funding. (Aleem, 
2010; Siddiqui, 2015a) Compared to those of developed countries, India’s capital markets are 
insufficiently developed. Thus, the central bank (i.e. RBI) stabilizes the exchange rate via 
interventions. 
There may be a reason why capital account convertibility may not be in the interest of an 
economy such as India. This may be due to government fiscal deficit, public debt and the 
capability of the financial sector to handle outflows. The budget deficit could then be 
transformed into a current account deficit and could possibly cause large depreciation. 
Capital inflows (except short-term debt) have been liberalised, meaning that quantitative 
restrictions have been removed and there are no bars to repatriation of both principal and 
return on these flows. (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar, 2009) 
Since the early 1990s, RBI has adopted market-oriented monetary policies, and controls 
lending through its monetary policy instrument. Prior to 1996, it only used quality 
instruments to control the amount of bank loans and the priority lending instrument was to 
meet the lending target in line with the ‘government’s developmental goals’. However, since 
1997 the RBI has used the price instruments to indirectly control the amount of bank loans 
but also uses priority sector lending targets. 
India took further measures to control capital in mid-2007, which were aimed at reducing the 
volume of capital inflows and the appreciation of the Rupee, discouraging portfolio capital 
inflows and decreasing the volatility on the Mumbai stock exchange. Balin concluded that for 
various reasons these measures achieved very little. He pointed out that the majority of the 
government’s stated goals were unattainable and investors were able to circumvent the capital 
control measures. During this period, corruption and favouritism was rampant within the RBI 
and securities and in practice the policy tilted in favour of large corporations. (Balin, 2008)  
Since the early 1980s, many developing countries have adopted measures of capital 
liberalization and these policies should be seen against the broader context of the global 
policy change in favour of market-friendly development strategies, also known in developing 
countries as the ‘Structural Adjustment Programme’, a policy recommended by the IMF and 
the World Bank. (Bonizzi, 2014) 
The ascendancy of finance has sought to reduce the autonomy of national decisions and 
control over monetary and fiscal policies. At present, developing economies are very 
vulnerable and the short-term capital flows that follow capital liberalization can lead to 
further economic fluctuations, inhibiting government ability to counter such tendencies that 
arise from outside sources. (Crotty and Epstein, 1999) 
The year 2015 was a difficult one for emerging markets, since not only did exports of goods 
and services decline but they even turned negative for some previously buoyant exporters. It 
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was also a time when capital flow reversed the course. IMF data shows that net capital flows 
into developing Asia declined significantly in 2014, marking a shift from the previous boom 
period for emerging markets, especially those in Asia. However, it appears that 2015 was 
even more devastating for emerging markets across the world, including those in Asia. Figure 
3 illustrates how serious the swings in capital flows were. 
Figure 3: Net Capital Flows to/from Emerging Asia (US$ billion) 
 
Source: IMF. 2016. Institute of International Finance, “Capital Flows to Emerging Markets”, 
19 January, IIF: Washington D.C. 
Figure 4: Change in Reserves and Current Account Balance in Emerging Asia (US$ billion) 
 
 
Source: IMF. 2016. Institute of International Finance, “Capital Flows to Emerging Markets”, 
19 January, IIF: Washington D.C. 
With the on-going global economic crisis, it is clear that capital flight from the emerging 
countries of Asia, for example, has risen sharply as shown in Figure 3. Taking the total of net 
inflows from non-residents into emerging markets across all regions minus the total of net 
capital outflows made by residents, and adding the effect of errors and omissions, the reports 
show a surprisingly large figure of US$ 735 billion net capital outflow in 2015, compared to 
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a net outflow of US$ 111 billion for the previous year. Much of this was driven by China, 
where net capital outflow in 2015 amounted to US$ 676 billion, including US$ 216 billion in 
unrecorded net outflows. However, even excluding China, emerging markets as a group 
experienced negative capital flows in both 2014 and 2015. (IMF, 2016) With regard to the 
foreign exchange reserves in the BRIC countries between 1991 and 2015 (as shown in Figure 
5.  
Figure 5: Foreign Exchange Reserves of BRICS countries, US$ billion 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; various years.  
When we look at China’s per capita income, the figure is quite impressive. However, despite 
the optimism and rapid growth in recent decades projected by a number of studies, as shown 
in Figure 6, the average per capita income is quite low among the BRIC countries compared 
to that of G7 countries. The GDP per capita does not reflect the differences in the cost of 
living, but increases in GDP per capita can indicate rises in productivity growth and also 
growth in the economy of a country. GDP per capita in India and China relative to US was as 
low as 3% in 1960. India’s relative GDP was 3% of that of the US in 2010, but China’s GDP 
per capita more than doubled to 8% for the same year, as shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Per Capita Income Growth for China and US 
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Source: The Economist, 2015; OECD, 2015 
 
The net capital inflows from non-residents to all emerging markets remained positive in 2015 
at an estimated US$ 293 billion. However, the more significant factor was that residents of 
these emerging markets took their money elsewhere: net private capital outflows by residents 
amounted to as much as US$ 824 billion, and the trend was evident in terms of both foreign 
equity investment and lending patterns. Unrecorded flows in the form of errors and omissions 
contributed to this haemorrhaging, amounting to as much as US$ 206 billion. Figure 4 
indicates the dramatic swings in the direction of net capital flows that have occurred in just 
three years. Net non-resident capital inflows into these seven Asian countries declined from 
nearly US$ 700 billion in 2013 to an estimated negative figure of around US$ 18 billion in 
2015. (IMF, 2016) 
The net inflow of US$ 98 billion in 2013 has become a net outflow of as much as US$ 216 
billion estimated for 2015. Once again this is hugely driven by what is happening in China in 
terms of unrecorded capital flight – the IIF estimates Errors and Omissions in the Chinese 
balance of payments to be greater than US$ 200 billion in 2015. Figure 4 shows that the 
estimated current account surplus in China for 2015 is US$ 270 billion, but in fact of these 
Asian countries, only India and Indonesia showed a deterioration in their current account 
balances (which were already in deficit) between 2014 and 2015. (IMF, 2016) The other 
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countries experienced slight improvements in their current account balances – but this did not 
prevent the substantial capital outflow.  
The Minsky’s criticism of capital account liberalisation directs us towards rent-seeking and 
speculation, which are expected to increase with the rise of cross-border capital flows in the 
developing countries. (Minsky, 1986) It means that financial de-regulation could lead to 
financial instability. As Mitchell and Toporowski (2014) note:  
“[Financial] deregulation is deemed to be an exogenous policy choice imposed on 
developing countries at the behest of the International Monetary Fund for the 
convenience of international banks. This forced liberalization is supposed to be the 
key issue for the political economy”. (Mitchell and Toporowski, 2014: 76)  
In fact, in the developing countries, the capital market operates under more complex system 
of corporate finance including multinational corporations, public enterprises and relatively 
small number of domestic private enterprises, who are more vulnerable to foreign capital 
inflows. (Levy, 2012) 
6. Concluding Remarks 
It is argued here that restrictions on capital mobility will enable developing countries to 
exercise monetary autonomy and stable exchange rates. In the face of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, India and China, for instance, slowed down their plans to liberalise their 
capital account. (Siddiqui, 2010) India, like China, has not fully liberalised capital flows and 
short-term debt inflows in particular have remained under tight control. Even this did help 
them maintain stability during the global financial crisis of the 2008. (Siddiqui, 2015b) In 
order to reduce the frequency of financial crises, developing countries need to take measures 
towards controlling capital inflows. These could be applied by a number of methods such as 
to limiting inflows or prohibiting capital entry into the country.  
Moreover, such controls might reduce the risk of financial crisis as they should prevent large 
inflows and also reduce excessive lending and short-term speculation and borrowing. Capital 
control is also expected to reduce the risk of sudden capital outflows if foreign capital decides 
to pull out of the country. If anything can be learnt from past experiences, these show that 
capital controls are important macroeconomic measures that a country can use to prevent and 
mitigate financial crisis. It seems that the essence of financial liberalisation is to ensure the 
stranglehold of finance over government control in developing countries, for although we live 
a world where countries remain nation-states, the reality is that capital is globalised. (Chang 
and Grabel, 2014) The policies should be subject to broader debate and checks. Here is this 
context the question, what is the social benefit of capital inflows one that is directly addressed 
in policy formulations that then needs to be regulated, as Joan Robinson warned: “It is easy 
enough to make models on stated assumptions. The difficulty is to find the assumptions that 
are relevant to reality…Even if the crises that are looming up are overcome and a new run of 
prosperity lies ahead, deeper problem will still remain. Modern capitalism has no purpose 
except to keep the show going…It should be the duty of economists to do their best to 
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enlighten the public about the economic aspects of these menacing problems”. (Robinson, 
1971:142-43) 
This study has found that financial liberalisation strengthens international capital; moreover, 
by assigning complete authority of the central banks, governments have little policy control 
over monetary and exchange rate. Increased power is transformed to bureaucrats and 
financiers who control international financial institutions. With the on-going global economic 
crisis facing the emerging Asian economies as a group, foreign exchange reserves declined 
by nearly US$ 400 billion, but not all countries showed the same trends in declining reserves. 
In China alone, the foreign exchange reserves are estimated to have declined by US$ 405 
billion over this period, which is still a relatively small drop considering that at the start of the 
year the country held more than US$ 4 trillion of such reserves. 
The study suggests that to protect the developing economies from the instability associated 
with the financial globalisation some degree of capital control is required. A new situation 
arises where during the sudden change in the international economy and it is important to 
know how to prevent shockwaves from affecting the economy. Those economies which are 
integrated into the international capital may prove to be at the mercy of external forces, in the 
absence of any control on capital and exchange rates. There is no doubt that in such 
circumstances capital control seems to be a useful tool for controlling capital movements and 
maintaining economic stability and sustainable growth in the developing countries. 
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